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A tale of two cities: From Davids Holdings
to Metcash
George A Hay and E Jane Murdoch*
In 1994, the Full Federal Court upheld the decision of the trial judge to
prevent the acquisition of QIW by Davids, on the grounds that, Davids would
become the only supplier of groceries to independent retailers in the
geographic market. While the independent retailers faced significant
competition in the downstream (retail) business from the integrated retail
chains, the Court found that such competition would not be sufficient to
prevent the exercise of monopoly power in the upstream (wholesale)
business.
In 2011, the Full Federal Court upheld the decision of the trial judge not to
prevent the acquisition by Metcash of Franklins. The acquisition had been
opposed by the ACCC on the grounds that it would leave Metcash as
effectively the only wholesale supplier of packaged groceries to independent
retailers in New South Wales. The Court rejected the Commission’s claim,
finding that the merged firm would not be able to exercise market power due
to the constraining presence downstream of the integrated retail chains.
Two cases with apparently similar facts. What explains the different
outcomes? In this article, we try to identify a critical analytical difference in
the way that the cases were presented to the Court and will suggest that this
difference may have had a significant influence on the outcomes.

1 Introduction
In 1994, the Full Federal Court upheld the decision of the trial judge to
prevent the hostile acquisition of a majority shareholding in QIW Retailers
Ltd (QIW) by Davids Holdings (Davids), on the grounds that, as a result of the
proposed merger, the merged company would be in a position to dominate a
market defined as the supply of grocery products by independent wholesalers
to independent retailers in Queensland and northern New South Wales.1 The
case was brought under the old s 50 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (as
amended in 1977) which contained the dominance test. In January 1993,
shortly after the trial in Davids Holdings had commenced, the Act was
amended to incorporate the ‘substantial lessening of competition’ test that is
still in effect today. However, the trial judge determined that, because the court
proceedings had already begun, according to s 21(2) of the amendment the
original terms of the Act would continue to apply.
* Hay is the Edward Cornell Professor of Law and Professor of Economics at Cornell
University (Ithaca, New York USA) and a Senior Consultant to Charles River Associates.
Murdoch is a Vice President at Charles River Associates, working out of its Oakland,
California office. Hay was one of the expert economists for Davids’ Holdings in the first
case; Hay and Murdoch, along with Lilla Csorgo, then of Charles River Associates, worked
together on the second case, and Hay provided expert economic testimony in that case.
1 Hay wrote about the Davids case in an earlier article, ‘Market Definition and Market
Dominance: Issues from the Davids-QIW Merger Case’ (1995) 3 CCLJ 2. For convenience
and consistency, portions of that article will be used in the factual summary of the case and
the various decisions in the case.
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The basic claim of the applicants2 was that, as a result of the merger, Davids
would be the only supplier of groceries to independent retailers in the
geographic market and would, as a result, be in a position to exercise
monopoly power. While the independent retailers faced significant
competition in the downstream (retail) business from the integrated retail
chains (such as Coles and Woolworths), the court found that such competition
would not be sufficient to prevent the exercise of monopoly power in the
upstream (wholesale) business.
In 2011, the Full Federal Court upheld the decision of the trial judge not to
prevent the acquisition by Metcash Trading Ltd (Metcash) of Interfrank Group
Holdings Pty Ltd (Franklins). The acquisition had been opposed by the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) on the grounds
that it would leave Metcash as (effectively) the only wholesale supplier of
packaged groceries to independent retailers in New South Wales.3 The court
rejected the commission’s claim, finding that the merged firm would not be
able to exercise market power due to the constraining presence downstream of
the integrated retail chains (primarily Coles and Woolworths).4
So we have two cases with, on the surface at least, very similar facts. Yet
the outcomes in the two cases were 180 degrees apart. What explains the
different outcomes? Of course, we have a different set of judges, different
lawyers, mostly different economists,5 somewhat different corporate entities,
mostly different geographic areas affected, different counterfactuals,6 and, of
course, the passage of almost 20 years. Any or all of these may have mattered.
However, in this article, we try to identify a critical analytical difference in the
way that the cases were presented to the court and will suggest that this
difference may have had a significant influence on the outcomes.
The analysis in Davids focused almost entirely, but with little concrete
evidence, on the question of whether downstream price competition from the
integrated chains, by itself, would be sufficient to prevent the would-be
monopolist independent wholesaler from charging a supra-competitive price
to at least some of its customers, the independent retail grocery stores; that is,
whether such a price would turn out to be unprofitable because it would be
passed on by the independent retailers who would then lose retail customers
to the integrated chains. The conclusion that the court drew was that such a
2 The applicants were QIW and the Attorney-General. The then Trade Practices Commission
did not oppose the transaction.
3 ACCC v Metcash Trading Ltd (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [113]
(Metcash.)
4 Ibid, at [340] and [430]. The court also took issue with the commission’s proposed
counter-factual: ibid, at [424]–[426] and [460]. The South African owner of Franklins (Pick
n Pay) had made an apparently irreversible corporate decision to exit the Australian market,
so the commission proposed a counterfactual that envisaged the Franklins stores providing
the nucleus for a new wholesaler that would compete against Metcash: ibid, at [347]–[349].
5 Professor Hay was the only economist directly involved in both litigation matters. There
were other economists who testified in Davids who may have had some involvement in
Metcash but not as testifying experts.
6 The counterfactual in Davids was that the acquisition of the majority shareholding would not
be permitted, leaving QIW to continue as an independent entity. As indicated below, by the
time of the trial in Metcash, it seemed clear that the status quo ante was not a plausible
option.
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supra-competitive price would not result in such a substantial loss of business
to the chains that it would be unprofitable and therefore concluded that the
other independent wholesaler was the only thing standing in the way of
Davids’ achieving dominance.7
In contrast, the Metcash analysis (as presented by the respondents and
apparently accepted by the court) identified in concrete terms a number of
ways that the integrated chains had competed and would continue to compete
against Metcash and demonstrated that with respect to all or almost all those
forms of competition, the chains posed a greater threat than Franklins to any
effort by Metcash to exploit market power. The implications for market
definition then were that the market could not properly be limited to the
‘wholesale supply of packaged groceries to independent supermarket
retailers’, as the applicant had urged.8

The factual backgrounds
Davids Holdings
Davids was the holding company of a group of companies whose principal
activities were the wholesaling and distribution of a range of grocery products
and liquor in Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland. QIW was the
holding company of a group of companies whose principal activities were the
wholesaling and distribution of a similar range of grocery products in
Queensland and northern New South Wales. The primary customers of Davids
and QIW relevant for the analysis of the transaction were independent retailers
of grocery products in Queensland and northern New South Wales, that is,
those retailers of grocery products other than the three major chains carrying
on business in the area (Coles, Franklins, and Woolworths).9 For all practical
purposes, Davids and QIW were the only companies serving independent
retailers in the geographic area at the time. The chains, in contrast, were and
still are vertically integrated, so that the function of getting the groceries from
the manufacturer to the retail outlets was performed in-house. Both the
independent retailers and the chains sold to the general public.
7 While the trial judge discussed the functional dimension of the market, his ultimate decision
was not based simply on the formal notion that the merging parties sell almost entirely at the
wholesale level and that the vertically integrated chains sell at the retail level. Rather, he
asked the economically correct question of whether the retail operations of the chains
operated as a significant check on the power of Davids and QIW and concluded that they did
not. Presumably, had he found otherwise, he would have answered the dominance question
differently, regardless of how he might have described or defined the market.
8 Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [1]. As will be discussed,
there was some tension between the market definition proposed by the applicant and that
preferred by its expert economist.
9 At the time, Franklins was operating as a vertically integrated grocery chain owned by Dairy
Farm International. See, Report of the ACCC Inquiry into the Competitiveness of Retail
Prices for Standard Groceries, July 2008, p 43 (2008 Grocery Inquiry.
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Metcash
Metcash supplied grocery products on a wholesale basis to independently
owned stores of all sizes in New South Wales and throughout Australia.10
Metcash was, by a wide margin, the largest wholesale supplier of groceries to
independently owned stores in New South Wales. In addition, while it did not
own retail grocery outlets outright,11 Metcash had a significant degree of
contractual vertical integration in relation to independent stores operating
under Metcash’s IGA banner.12 IGA stores were required to run their
businesses according to Metcash standards governing the look and feel of the
store and to price in accordance with advertised promotional activities.13
Metcash offered the IGA stores a range of services including retail business
advice, financial backing for leases, and investment subsidies in store
refurbishments.14
In 2001, Pick n Pay (Pty) Ltd (Pick n Pay), a South African based grocery
retailer acquired the Franklins brand and 70 retail grocery stores in New South
Wales.15 Over the ensuing decade, Pick n Pay made further investments to
acquire and open new Franklins stores and to refurbish existing stores. In
addition, in 2006, Franklins launched a programme to establish franchise
stores that would operate under the Franklins banner.16 By the time of the
merger, Franklins owned 79 retail grocery stores, operated one more, and had
franchise agreements with 10 stores.17 Under Pick n Pay’s ownership,
Franklins also entered the upstream business of wholesale grocery supply
although it never supplied third-party retail stores.18
Pick n Pay’s total investment in Franklins by the time of the hearing was
about $289 million, and Franklins had suffered losses in seven of the years it
10 Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [21].
11 Metcash did have a 26% ownership interest in several IGA supermarket stores, which, in
general, were high volume Supa IGA stores. Those investments were intended to secure
Metcash’s wholesale supply to the stores: Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967;
BC201106415 at [205].
12 Stores operating under the IGA banner accounted for between 70–75% of sales by Metcash’s
wholesale grocery division: Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415
at [21].
13 Ibid, at [39]–[40].
14 Ibid, at [21], [258]–[259], [276]–[277]. Some services, such as the retail pricing service were
available to Metcash’s non-IGA customers as well: ibid, at [35].)
15 Pick n Pay acquired the Franklins brand and 50 stores from Dairy Farm International and 20
Fresco stores, all in New South Wales. Franklins stores not acquired by Pick n Pay, including
those outside New South Wales, were either sold to competing retailers and re-branded, or
closed: 2008 Grocery Inquiry, above n 9, p 43. Pick n Pay did not acquire any wholesaling
assets in these transactions: Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415
at [72].
16 Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [285].
17 Ibid, at [13]–[14].
18 From 2001 through 2004, Franklins stores had acquired grocery inputs primarily through
Metcash, but in 2005, Franklins began to self-supply groceries: Metcash (2011) 282 ALR
464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [72]–[74]. Unlike Metcash, Franklins achieved
much of its wholesale grocery supply service through contractual arrangements rather than
through full-scale integration of the warehousing and distribution functions: Metcash (2011)
282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [338].
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was owned by Pick n Pay, for net losses of $105 million over the period.19
Pick n Pay resolved to sell its Franklins assets, either in a block to a single
buyer, or piecemeal if necessary.20 In July 2010, Metcash proposed to acquire
Franklins.21 Metcash planned to close down Franklins’ warehouse assets and
sell the Franklins stores, with the hope of expanding the Metcash wholesale
customer base in New South Wales and achieving greater economies of scale
in wholesale activities.22

The proceedings
Davids Holdings
The takeover by Davids was not contested by the (then) Trade Practices
Commission but was opposed both by QIW and by the Attorney-General, and
litigation commenced in 1992 based on the claim that the proposed merger
would violate s 50 of the Trade Practices Act. As discussed above, because the
amendments to s 50 were not in place when it began, the litigation was based
on the unamended version of s 50, that is, whether, as a result of the
acquisition, the corporation would be, or would be likely to be, in a position
to dominate a market for goods or services.23 The applicants asserted that the
relevant market was limited to wholesalers to independent retail stores and
that the merged firm would have effectively 100% of such a market. The
respondents claimed that the relevant market must somehow account for the
activities of the chains and that, however the market was described, the
merged firm would not be dominant.
A trial was held in the Federal Court in Brisbane in late 1992 before
Spender J and a decision was handed down on 30 April 1993.24 The trial judge
held that the relevant market was for the supply of grocery products by
independent wholesalers to independent retailers in Queensland and northern
New South Wales, that the market was a substantial one, and that the merged
entity would, or would be likely to, dominate the market. Davids appealed, but
the decision of the trial judge was upheld by the Full Federal Court (Von
Doussa, O’Loughlin and Drummond JJ) on 22 April 1994.25

Metcash
In November of 2010, the ACCC informed the parties that it considered the
merger would substantially lessen competition in a market for the wholesale
19
20
21
22
23

Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [20].
Ibid, at [422].
Ibid, at [2].
Ibid, at [338] and [451].
Since then, the amended statute (where the test is based on a substantial lessening of
competition) has gone into effect. However, whether the ultimate test is dominance or
substantial lessening of competition, under either test, market definition is still usually the
first and often most critical step despite a push by some academics (with some support from
the US antitrust agencies) to bypass it. See, L Kaplow, Market Definition and the Merger
Guidelines, Review of Industrial Organization, vol 39, 2011, pp 107–125 and US
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, ‘Horizontal Merger Guidelines’,
19 August 2010, § 4 (US Merger Guidelines).
24 (1993) ATPR 41-227.
25 (1994) 49 FCR 211; 121 ALR 241; ATPR 41-304; BC9405829.
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supply of packaged groceries to independent supermarket retailers in New
South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory.26 The ACCC commenced a
proceeding to block the proposed acquisition, and a decision by Emmet J was
issued in favour of the merging parties on 25 August 2011. The decision was
upheld by the Full Federal Court (Finn, Buchanan and Yates JJ) in November
2011, and the acquisition of Franklins by Metcash was completed thereafter.
The decision in the initial hearing was based on a detailed discussion of the
market in which Franklins and Metcash operated and the identification of
players that were ‘in’ that market in the sense that they would constrain the
ability of the merged entity to raise prices. A second issue the judge addressed,
though he claimed that strictly speaking he need not,27 was the likely
competitive outcome with the merger compared to the likely competitive
outcome without the merger.

The analysis
Davids Holdings
The respondents claimed, using a standard Chicago-school model, that, if at
retail there was perfect (or near-perfect) competition between the independent
stores and the integrated chains, then the retail prices of the independent stores
would be completely constrained by the prices of the integrated chains, and
therefore, even if the independent stores had no alternative but to buy from the
post-merger monopoly wholesaler, there would be no opportunity for that
‘monopolist’ profitably to increase prices, because any attempt to increase
prices would cause a significant shift by consumers to the integrated chains
and a corresponding loss of sales by the single wholesaler. Therefore, the
single wholesaler could not be said to be dominant in any economic sense.
Analytically, if the independent stores and integrated chains were in the same
retail market, then it did not make sense to treat the wholesaling activities of
Davids and QIW as in a separate market from the wholesale ‘activities’ of the
integrated chains.
The court in Davids was certainly aware that, at the retail level, the
independent retail stores faced competition from the integrated chains, though
the court never reached the point of agreeing that, at the retail level, the
independents and the chains were in the same market. The court may either
have disagreed with the respondents’ proposition or thought it irrelevant to the
analysis of the merger. One of the factors influencing the court’s thinking was
the degree of product differentiation it perceived to be present in grocery
retailing. Independent stores were generally smaller, and typically operated
longer hours (due at least in part to regulatory constraints on the chains’ hours
of operation), and at least for some customers, may have been more
conveniently located. The independents also typically charged higher prices
26 Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [2] and [181].
27 Ibid, at [342]: ‘The Commission has based its case solely on there being a separate market
for the wholesale supply to independent retailers of packaged groceries, as defined. The
commission’s pleaded case as to market definition has not been made out. It follows that the
proceeding must fail. However, I propose to deal with the issue as to the counterfactuals
propounded by the Commission’.
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for similar items, which the court took, probably mistakenly, as a sign that the
independents enjoyed a non-trivial degree of market power. (The alternative
view is that the higher prices were necessary to cover the independent stores’
higher costs, and that the longer hours, and sometimes more convenient
locations, were enhanced service offerings through which the stores offset the
higher prices in an effort to retain customers.)28 If the independent stores did
enjoy a degree of market power, that is, their prices were not constrained to
a competitive level by the retail prices of the integrated chains, then there
might have been some market power rents for the post-merger wholesale
monopolist to extract.29
Subsequent to the court’s disapproval of the proposed merger, a nearly
identical transaction was authorised by the tribunal on public benefit
grounds.30 While, technically, the tribunal did not overrule Davids Holdings,
the tribunal’s analysis was much closer to that proposed by the respondents in
Davids Holdings than to that put forward by the court.

Metcash
As the respondents’ expert discussed in the Metcash proceeding, the reality
was more nuanced than the applicant’s description of the grocery business as
consisting of vertically integrated chains, on the one hand, and independent
retail stores, on the other, with the independent retail stores being supplied
principally by one of two wholesalers that participated in a market described
as ‘wholesale supply of packaged groceries to independent supermarkets’.31
The overwhelming portion of Franklins’ business was conducted through its
80 company-operated stores, so in that sense, while small, Franklins looked
more like one of the vertically integrated chains.32 Franklins’ role as a supplier
of groceries to independent retailers was limited to the sales it made to the 10
franchised Franklins stores, although there was the potential to expand
Franklins’ wholesale business at the expense of Metcash. But, strictly
speaking, Franklins’ actual share of a market described as ‘the wholesale
supply of packaged groceries to independent grocery stores’ was, according to
Metcash, small enough that there would be no significant increase in market
concentration.33
At the same time, while Metcash did not own any retail stores outright,
Metcash owned the IGA banner under which most of its largest retail
customers operated and had complex contractual relationships with those
retail stores, so there was vertical integration by contract rather than through
ownership. Metcash was not simply a ‘box-mover’, that is, providing a depot
28 The judge in Metcash was of this alternative view: (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967;
BC201106415 at [252] and [256].
29 The trial judge also seemed heavily influenced by the fact that, when Davids originally
entered the wholesale business against QIW, wholesale prices fell, at least temporarily, by as
much as 3%. This historical evidence was never explained by the respondents to the
satisfaction of the court and was taken to suggest that, after the merger, prices could go back
up by 3%.
30 Re Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 225; ATPR 41-324;
BC9502743.
31 Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [110].
32 Ibid, at [331].
33 Ibid, at [437].
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for and possibly transporting to customers the groceries that the customers had
ordered from the suppliers. Metcash negotiated prices with the suppliers, on
the one hand, and, on the other, offered a ‘Mix and Match Retail Pricing
System’ that facilitated retailers’ pricing within their chosen range against
price-checked items offered by Woolworths and Coles.34 In addition, in
relation to the IGA banner, Metcash made strategic decisions about retail sites
and stores, provided loans and adopted strategies for the refurbishment of
stores,35 funded marketing activity,36 supplied a line of private label
products,37 and set out operating guidelines for a cohesive banner concept.38
Therefore, rather than focus on the debate about the right ‘functional’
definition of the market (a debate engaged in far more frequently in Australia
than in the United States), the respondents posed the question quite simply:
how, in principle, could Franklins operate as a competitive constraint on any
attempt by Metcash to exercise market power? Three primary ways were
identified:
a) By keeping the prices at which it supplied groceries to its franchised
stores low (on the assumption that those low prices would be passed
on at least in part by the franchised stores) and keeping the retail
prices low at its company-owned stores, Franklins could constrain
Metcash to keep its wholesale prices low lest Metcash-supplied
stores passed on their higher costs to customers and lost sales to
Franklins stores, and thereby caused Metcash to lose wholesale sales.
Franklins could also do a variety of things to make its
company-owned stores and franchised retailers more attractive from
a non-price perspective, for example, by supporting or directly
paying for improvements in store appearance.
b) If Metcash was seeking to exercise market power over its retail
stores, Franklins could seek to convert those stores from Metcash to
Franklins, either by seeking to entice a Metcash-supplied retailer to
switch and become a Franklins franchisee or by acquiring
Metcash-supplied stores and operating them as Franklins corporate
stores. Franklins could also build new stores to operate as corporate
stores or sell to franchisees. From 2001, when Pick n Pay acquired
Franklins, the company saw a net increase of only 10
corporate-operated stores and 10 franchise stores.39
c) Franklins could decide to enter the business of offering wholesale
supply to independent grocery retailers beyond the 10 Franklins
franchise stores. The judge observed that Franklins did not consider
34 Ibid, at [35]–[38] and [258]–[259]. This service was available to wholly independent
retailers as well as to the IGA stores.
35 Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [259].
36 Ibid, at [259].
37 Ibid, at [31]–[33].
38 Ibid, at [39]–[41].
39 From 2005, when Franklins adopted its franchising strategy, it succeeded in convincing only
two owners of IGA stores to convert their stores to the Franklins franchise. Franklins did not
win over any IGA store owners from Metcash after 2007: Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464;
[2011] FCA 967; BC201106415, at [275].
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itself a wholesaler and had not set up its business on the basis of
being a wholesaler to third parties.40
Next, the respondents compared this to the ways in which the vertically
integrated chains might, in principle, constrain any effort by Metcash to
exercise market power over the retail stores it supplied:
a) By acquiring groceries at low prices and in turn passing those savings
on to the ultimate consumer in the form of low retail prices, the
chains could put pressure on Metcash to keep its wholesale prices
low lest the Metcash-supplied stores lose retail business to the
chains, thereby reducing the volume of Metcash’s wholesale sales.
The judge found vigorous price competition between independent
retailers and the major supermarket chains.41 Metcash performed
weekly price checks of 1200 to 1500 items at Woolworths and Coles
stores and offered its customers pricing advice according to how
closely each independent store sought to price against the chains.42
As the judge correctly observed, it did not necessarily follow that
retailers that priced 2 or more per cent higher than the chains were
not closely constrained by vigorous competition. Rather, to the extent
that some independent retailers charged prices above the prices of the
major supermarket chains, that may have reflected higher costs rather
than any supra-normal profits.43 The chains could also engage in
expenditures to make their retail stores more attractive from a
non-price perspective. The judge found vigorous non-price
competition between independent retailers and the major
supermarket chains.44 The major chains had improved access to their
stores by acquiring or opening medium and small stores in locations
that were previously served only by independent grocery stores. Thus
chain-owned stores were ‘ubiquitous across Australia’ and ‘available
to almost everyone’.45 Further, following upon the relaxation of
regulations, extended trading hours had become standard for chain
stores.46 Efforts by the chain stores to develop stronger ties with local
communities constituted another element of non-price competition
by the chains that had grown over the decade.47
b) The chains could offer to buy out a Metcash-supplied retailer and
convert that retailer to a chain retailer. The judge observed that over
the past 10 years, Woolworths, and to a lesser degree Coles, had
‘adopted a strategy of targeting particular independent retailers,
including IGA bannered retailers, offering to buy their stores, often at
a premium, and converting them into Woolworths or Coles branded
stores’.48 From 2002, Woolworths and Coles had acquired at least
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Ibid,
Ibid,
Ibid,
Ibid,
Ibid,
Ibid,
Ibid,
Ibid,
Ibid,

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

[331].
[239].
[36].
[252].
[239].
[272].
[272].
[272].
[47].
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seven stores that previously were supplied by Metcash.49 This
competition for retail outlets had led Metcash to adopt a strategy of
acquiring minority equity interests in independent retailers’ stores.50
In addition, Metcash offered loans and sometimes became the head
lessee in respect of a store site in return for a right of first refusal.51
The chains could also build new stores. In all, Woolworths and Coles
had acquired at least 37 independent grocery stores or store sites
since 2002.52
c) It was possible that one or both of the chains would consider
providing wholesaling services to independent grocery stores. The
major chains did not offer wholesale supply to any third party retail
outlets in New South Wales, although doing so was not foreign to
Woolworths. From 1996 to 2002, Woolworths had supplied grocery
products to independent retailers in the eastern states.53 In 2004,
Woolworths had considered entering into a joint venture with Pick n
Pay to supply franchise stores, and Metcash contended that as
recently as 2010 Woolworths had contemplated re-entering the
grocery wholesaling business.54 In addition, for a number of years,
Woolworths had held a 60% ownership interest in a wholesale
grocery business that supplied Woolworths and independent retailers
in Tasmania.55
The empirical question then became very straightforward. Along each of these
dimensions, or on the overall package, was Franklins more of a threat to
Metcash than either of the integrated chains? If the chains were overall more
of a constraint, then it was incongruous to define a market that contained
Metcash and Franklins but excluded the chains. The US Merger Guidelines
have a specific example that is right on point:
Example 6: . . . [S]uppose that half of the unit sales lost by Product A when it raises
price are diverted to Product C, . . . while one-third are diverted to Product B.
Product C is a closer substitute for Product A than is Product B. Thus Product C will
normally be included in the relevant market, even though Products A and B together
satisfy the hypothetical monopolist test.56

The respondents argued that historically Franklins had been less of a threat to
Metcash than the chains on any of the dimensions identified above.57 The
point was not that Franklins should be excluded from the market but simply
that, if Franklins was included, then the chains should be included as well.58
The trial judge agreed with this analysis:
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Ibid, at [273].
Ibid, at [274].
Ibid, at [274].
Ibid, at [273].
Ibid, at [47].
Ibid, at [289].
Ibid, at [289] and <http://www.igatas.com.au/at-last,-a-$75m-goer-distribution-centre>
(accessed 7 December 2012).
56 US Merger Guidelines, above n 23, § 3.
57 Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [329]–[336].
58 With the chains included, the shares of the merging parties would have been quite low and
the applicant would not have asserted that the merger should be stopped. This was litigated
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. . . I consider that the competitive constraint imposed by Franklins upon Metcash’s
wholesaling activities is far less significant than the constraint imposed by the major
supermarket chains. Further, the constraint imposed by Franklins has diminished
somewhat over time. On the other hand, the constraint imposed by the major
supermarket chains is strong and is increasing.59
Accordingly, if Franklins is in the relevant market with Metcash, the major
supermarket chains must also be included in that market. Given that the major
supermarket chains are a closer competitive constraint upon Metcash than Franklins,
it follows that, if Franklins would be able to prevent a hypothetical monopolist
wholesaler from imposing what I have described as a relevant increase in price,
being a small but significant non-transitory increase in price, so must the major
supermarket chains be able to do so. Necessarily, the application of the hypothetical
monopolist test would include both the major supermarket chains and Franklins in
the relevant market with Metcash.60

Approaching the problem this way eliminated several of the issues raised by
the applicant and/or the applicant’s expert economist. For example, the
applicant’s expert defined the market as a service market with Metcash
providing wholesaling services for the supply of dry groceries to independent
retail stores.61 There are examples in the US Merger Guidelines involving a
simple service in a supply chain as the relevant product and its identifiable
mark-up as the relevant price for a SSNIP test, as in the case of pipelines
transporting oil.62 However, the respondents argued that to describe Metcash
as providing simply ‘wholesale services,’ given the wide range of activities
Metcash engaged in and the various sources of its revenues, badly
mischaracterised what Metcash did, which was to obtain groceries from
suppliers at favourable prices, warehouse them, and sell them to retail stores,
while at the same time undertaking a multitude of activities to assist the
retailer to sell more of those groceries and/or to sell them more profitably. The
judge observed that following the applicant’s logic, one might also describe a

59
60
61

62

as a traditional ‘market definition, market concentration’ case, rather than as a unilateral
effects case. Of course, even if the chains were counted as ‘in the market’, there could still
have been a unilateral effect resulting from a merger of Metcash and Franklins. However,
based on small market shares and the historical evidence, the respondents would have been
prepared to argue that any such effect would have been too small to be deemed a substantial
lessening of competition.
Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [330].
Ibid, at [334] (original emphasis).
Ibid, at [121]. The applicant’s expert pointed to §4.1.2 in the US Merger Guidelines for
support for this approach. However, the judge did not agree: Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464;
[2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [191]–[200]. In the statement of claim, the market was
defined as the ‘supply of wholesale packaged groceries to independent supermarket
retailers’.
US Merger Guidelines, above n 23, Example 8. The SSNIP test is used to define the smallest
possible relevant market by asking whether a hypothetical monopolist in the market could
profitably impose a ‘small but significant and non-transitory increase in price’ (SSNIP)
above the price level that would prevail without the merger, assuming the terms of sale of
all other products are held constant. See also, ACCC, Merger Guidelines, November 2008,
at [4.19]–[4.22]. The judge found the grocery industry to be characterised by a high degree
of vertical integration and considered that in applying the hypothetical monopolist test it was
unrealistic to consider the wholesale margin as a basis for a SSNIP. The relevant basis, he
concluded was the price charged by wholesalers to their retail store customers: Metcash
(2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [194]–[200] and [339]–[340].
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retailer as a provider of a bundle of services. He concluded that the applicant’s
proposed distinction had no foundation in logic or reality. According to the
judge, whether at the retail or wholesale level, the SSNIP was appropriately
applied to the selling price, not to the seller’s margin.63
The point of the narrow product definition proposed by the applicant’s
expert was to allow him to use Metcash’s service fees, rather than the price of
the goods that Metcash sold at wholesale as the basis for the SSNIP test. The
service fees, of course, would have been a much smaller base for applying the
5% SSNIP test and, in response to a price increase in Metcash’s fees of 5%,
the impact on the retail price of goods sold by the retailer would have been so
small that one might have claimed that the result would be only a trivial switch
by consumers to shopping at the integrated chains rather than at the
Metcash-supplied stores (thereby appearing to support a claim that the
integrated chains were not in the same market as Metcash). But of course, the
same would have been true, a fortiori, with respect to a loss of retail sales to
Franklins stores. So the respondents’ argument was simple: use whatever basis
for a SSNIP you like, but if you want to assert that Franklins is in the same
market as Metcash while it is clear that the threat of lost sales to the chains is
at least as great as the threat of lost sales to Franklins (by virtue of all of the
mechanisms identified above: loss of retails sales, conversion of stores, or
switching at the wholesale level), then any market that includes both Metcash
and Franklins must also include the chains.64
Indeed, the applicant’s expert argued that a 5% SSNIP for such a small
margin business as the supply of wholesale services would translate to a price
increase of much less than 5% (0.26%) in the retail price and would be
unlikely to cause sufficient lost retail sales to make the upstream increase
unprofitable.65 Therefore, if the wholesale price of groceries (rather than the
wholesale service fees) were to be adopted as the basis for a price increase, a
SSNIP as small as 1% would be appropriate.66 The respondents’ expert took
issue with the relevance of the examples in the US Merger Guidelines
referenced by the applicant’s economist, but the bottom line was the same as
above: use whatever percent you like for applying the SSNIP, but if, in
response to whatever SSNIP you use, Metcash would lose more sales to the
chains than to the only other ‘independent wholesaler’, any market that
includes the other wholesaler must also include the chains.

Conclusion
So what to make of the different outcomes? The authors are quite confident
that the outcome in Metcash was the correct one. Another way to think about
the issue is to ask whether the chains were likely to face a more competitive
63 Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [198]–[200].
64 The applicant, in urging the narrower market definition, in effect had conceded that, if the
market were defined to include the integrated chains, the merger would not lead to a
substantial lessening of competition: Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967;
BC201106415 at [429].
65 Metcash (2011) 282 ALR 464; [2011] FCA 967; BC201106415 at [193].
66 The US Merger Guidelines discuss that, when a SSNIP based on the total price paid by
customers represents a large value relative to suppliers’ margins, a smaller price increase
than 5% will be used. See, US Merger Guidelines, above n 23, Example 10.
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world as a result of a strengthened Metcash resulting from the merger than
they would have faced under either a continuation of the status quo ante or
under any reasonably likely counterfactual. Almost certainly the answer lies
with the former. The independent stores’ best current hope for survival against
the chains is a strengthened Metcash, able to take advantage of increased
economies of scale in operations and enhanced purchasing power, and with a
strong incentive to pass on at least some portion of these cost savings to its
customers.
The authors (especially the one of us who testified in Davids) are also
inclined to the view that the outcome in Davids was wrong but concede that
the record on the extent of competition from the chains may not have been
nearly as well developed in Davids as it was in Metcash, and, in any event, the
degree of competition between and from the chains may have been
substantially less in the early 1990s before the chains expanded their hours of
operations and opened more stores so as to offset the possible locational
advantage of the independents. So perhaps both outcomes were correct in their
own time.
In any event, the experience is a valuable one going forward if it suggests
a more sensible way of dealing with competition in markets that involve
differentiated products and firms with varying business models, and especially
different degrees of vertical integration.

Postscript — a side issue
The role of economists in trade practices litigation
It probably is fair to say that both experts (and their solicitors) in Metcash
were somewhat taken aback by the limitations that the trial judge put on expert
testimony. Both experts were cognisant of the reluctance of Australian courts
to allow experts to engage in fact-finding, so both were careful to base their
conclusions on a quite extensive set of factual assumptions, clearly laid out in
their respective reports. Both experts started with a set of general economic
principles about how to define markets and how to assess whether any given
merger would lead to a substantial lessening of competition but then
proceeded to apply those principles to the assumed facts of the case and draw
fairly specific (contingent) conclusions (based on the assumption that the
assumed facts would be proven) about the proper definition of the market and
whether there would be a substantial lessening of competition.
However, the trial judge seemed interested in nothing more than the core
principles of market definition and substantial lessening of competition, as
they would be set out in an economics textbook, and thought it was then his
task to determine the facts and apply the principles to those facts with no help
from the economists. Indeed, he seemed uninterested even in the economists’
views on the hypotheticals that referred to the businesses at issue in the trial.
So at the end of the day, he accepted into evidence only those portions of the
expert reports that contained purely abstract statements of economic principle
and relegated the rest of the reports to submissions. Whether he was at all
influenced by the content of the rest of the reports (which were of course
heavily used in the lawyers’ closing submissions as well) only he can say
(though the opinion seems clearly to adopt a number of the arguments made
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in the ‘rejected’ portions of the reports).
We are not the people most qualified to assess whether the limited role that
the judge was prepared to allow the experts to play was a strict manifestation
of the rules of evidence or more a matter of personal preference. We would
observe that, in other cases in which one of the authors was involved as an
expert (including Boral and C7), the trial judges seemed prepared to allow the
experts to play a more expansive role. But more importantly, solely from a
policy perspective, such a limited role seems overly conservative. We think
that both experts genuinely (and with good cause) believed that limiting the
expert evidence merely to abstract principles that could be found in a good
textbook failed to make effective (and helpful) use of the economists’ skill,
training, and experience. But since others, closer to the Australian scene, have
written on this topic, we rest with those observations and comments.67

67 See, eg, M Brunt, ‘Antitrust in the Courts: The Role of Economics and Economists’ in
B Hawk (Ed), Fordham Corporate Law Institute: International Antitrust Law and Policy,
Juris Publishing, Huntington, New York, 1999, p 367, reprinted with updated commentary in
M Brunt, Economic Essays on Australian and New Zealand Competition Law, Kluwer Law
International, 2003. See also, R French, ‘Expert Testimony, Opinion, Argument and the
Rules of Evidence’ (2008) 36 ABLR 263–80; J Mansfield, ‘Opportunities and Challenges:
Evidence in Cases Under the Trade Practices Act 1974’, Presented at Competition Law
Conference, 2008, 24 May 2008; and C Veljanovski, ‘Economists in Court: A Comparative
Assessment of Procedures and Experience in Australia and England & Wales from an
Economist’s Perspective’, presented at 7th Annual University of South Australia Trade
Practices Workshop, 16–17 October 2009 (with minor revisions November 2009).

